Should NC Real Estate Brokers Ever Send Wiring Instructions?

A buyer asks you to send the wiring instructions for closing.

The closing attorney emails them to you, so you forward the message to your client. You may even add a friendly note: “Here you go! Let me know when it’s done.”

Helpful, right?

Unfortunately, that simple forwarded email could place your client’s entire closing fund at risk—and place you directly in the middle of a fraud investigation.

For North Carolina real estate brokers, the safest answer is clear: do not serve as the middleman for wiring instructions. The instructions should travel directly between the closing attorney and the person sending or receiving the money.

A Recent NCREC Warning to a Broker

During a recent meeting, the North Carolina Real Estate Commission reviewed a matter involving wiring instructions. The Commission closed its case against one broker without disciplinary action, but it still cautioned the broker to exercise greater care and refrain from participating in the dissemination of wiring instructions in real estate transactions.

That distinction is important.

The broker was not disciplined in that particular decision, but the Commission’s caution makes clear that forwarding or otherwise distributing wiring instructions is conduct brokers should avoid. A broker does not have to intentionally participate in fraud to create additional risk. Simply placing yourself in the transmission chain can provide another account for a criminal to compromise, another message to alter, and another reason for a client to believe the information has been verified.

What Can Go Wrong With One Forwarded Email?

NCREC has published a case study involving a newly licensed provisional broker representing a first-time homebuyer.

One day before settlement, the broker received an email that appeared to come from the closing attorney. The message contained wiring instructions for the buyer’s settlement funds. In reality, a hacker had accessed the law firm’s email account and sent fraudulent instructions.

The broker forwarded the email to the buyer and told the buyer to wire the funds to the account identified in the message. The broker did not tell the buyer to call the closing attorney and independently verify the instructions.

The buyer wired $42,000.

The following day, the closing attorney informed the buyer that the money had never arrived. The funds had been sent to a fraudulent account and could not be recovered.

NCREC concluded in its analysis that the broker contributed to the fraudulent activity by forwarding the instructions without directing the client to verify them with the closing attorney. The Commission explained that brokers acting as fiduciaries are expected to protect their clients’ personal information and safeguard property connected with the transaction, including closing funds.

This Has Already Resulted in Discipline in North Carolina

In another North Carolina transaction, a buyer contracted to purchase an unimproved lot for $23,000.

Before closing, the buyer’s agent emailed the closing attorney seeking wiring instructions for the client. A hacker intercepted the communications and replied with fraudulent instructions. The agent did not call the attorney to verify the information and did not instruct the buyer to do so.

The agent forwarded the instructions to the client, who wired $23,330.09 to the hacker’s account. The buyer lost the money and was unable to complete the purchase.

The Commission reprimanded the broker.

The lesson is not merely that brokers should verify wiring instructions before forwarding them. The better practice is to avoid forwarding the instructions at all.

Why Brokers Should Stay Out of the Transmission Chain

NCREC has advised that wiring instructions should be communicated directly between the closing attorney and the person sending or receiving the wire.

Passing the instructions through a real estate broker creates an additional opportunity for interception. It may also delay delivery, interfere with security procedures used by the law firm, and create potential liability for the broker who forwarded the information.

A broker’s involvement can also unintentionally give fraudulent instructions credibility.

Clients naturally trust their agents. When instructions arrive from the agent’s email address, the client may reasonably assume that the agent has reviewed and authenticated the information—even when the agent has merely clicked “Forward.”

That assumption can become especially dangerous when a hacker has gained access to the agent’s email account and studied the transaction. These criminals may know the property address, closing date, purchase price, attorney’s name, and even how the participants normally communicate.

The fraudulent message may not look suspicious at all.

What Should the Broker Do Instead?

The broker can still help the client without handling the actual wiring instructions.

1. Direct the client to the closing attorney

Tell the buyer or seller to obtain all wiring instructions directly from the closing attorney’s office. Do not request the instructions on the client’s behalf and then forward them.

2. Use an independently verified telephone number

The client should call a number obtained independently from the email containing the instructions. A phone number appearing in a fraudulent email may connect directly to the criminal.

The number should come from a reliable source, such as the law firm’s official website, previously verified contact information, or another independent directory.

3. Treat any change as presumed fraud

A message claiming that the bank, account name, routing number, account number, or branch location has changed should immediately raise concern.

NCREC advises that any request to change wiring instructions should be presumed fraudulent until verified through direct, independent communication. Email verification alone is not sufficient.

4. Have the client confirm receipt

After initiating the transfer, the client should call the closing attorney’s office using the independently verified number and confirm that the funds were received.

The sooner a fraudulent transfer is detected, the greater the possibility that a financial institution or law-enforcement agency may be able to intervene.

5. Document the warning

Brokers should provide wire-fraud warnings early in the transaction and retain documentation showing that the warning was delivered.

A disclaimer in an email signature can be useful, but it should not replace a direct conversation. A warning that no one reads at the bottom of a 20-message email chain is not the same as clearly telling a client:

Do not rely on wiring instructions sent or forwarded by email. Call the closing attorney directly at an independently verified number before sending any money.

What Can a Broker Safely Send?

There is an important difference between sending wiring instructions and sending a wire-fraud warning.

A broker may appropriately:

• Remind the client that wire fraud is common.

• Direct the client to communicate with the closing attorney.

• Provide general information about safe verification procedures.

• Encourage the client to obtain the attorney’s telephone number independently.

• Remind the client to confirm receipt immediately after initiating the wire.

The broker should not:

• Forward an email containing account or routing information.

• Copy wiring instructions into a new email or text message.

• Tell the client that emailed instructions are correct.

• call the attorney, obtain the instructions, and relay them to the client.

• Treat a familiar name or email address as proof that a message is authentic.

The broker’s role is to educate and direct—not authenticate bank information.

BICs Should Establish a Clear Office Policy

Wire-fraud prevention should not be left to each affiliated broker’s personal judgment.

NCREC’s case study also emphasized the supervising BIC’s responsibility. The provisional broker involved had received little training or supervision. The BIC had not reviewed the broker’s transactions or established sufficient communication regarding safe brokerage practices.

A firm’s written policy should clearly state that brokers may not transmit, forward, rewrite, or verify wiring instructions. It should also establish procedures for:

• Delivering fraud warnings to clients

• Independently verifying attorney contact information

• Reporting suspicious emails

• Responding when a client may have sent money to the wrong account

• Securing brokerage email accounts with strong passwords and multifactor authentication

The procedure should be simple enough that no broker has to make up the rules during the final 24 hours before closing.

Potential Liability Is Not Theoretical

In a wire-fraud case outside North Carolina, a buyer lost $196,622.67 after fraudulent closing instructions were allegedly forwarded by a real estate representative.

A jury assigned 85% of the fault to the representative and 15% to the buyer. The court entered a judgment of $167,129.27 against the representative. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably determine that sending the instructions implied they were accurate and that the buyer reasonably relied on them.

The case illustrates why forwarding instructions is not a harmless administrative favor. Once a broker sends financial information to a client, the client may interpret that action as the broker’s assurance that the information can be trusted.

The Bottom Line

Real estate brokers want to make transactions easier for their clients. But when it comes to wiring instructions, the most helpful thing a broker can do is step out of the transmission chain.

Do not forward the email.

Do not copy and paste the account information.

Do not tell the client the instructions look legitimate.

Instead, direct the client to communicate with the closing attorney directly, verify everything through independently obtained contact information, and confirm that the funds were received.

That extra telephone call may protect the client’s savings, preserve the closing, and prevent a well-intentioned broker from becoming part of a Commission investigation.

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This article is provided for educational purposes and is not legal advice. Brokers should consult their Broker-in-Charge, closing attorney, and applicable firm policies regarding specific transactions.

References

North Carolina Association of REALTORS®. “When Hackers Strike.” NCREC Bulletins, North Carolina Real Estate Commission, vol. 48, no. 3, Feb. 2018. Accessed 6 Aug. 2026.

North Carolina Real Estate Commission. “Case Study: Wire Fraud.” NCREC Bulletins, Feb. 2025. Accessed 6 Aug. 2026.

North Carolina Real Estate Commission. “Disciplinary Actions: August 2025.” NCREC Bulletins, Aug. 2025. Accessed 6 Aug. 2026.

North Carolina Real Estate Commission. “May 20, 2026 Commission Meeting Minutes.” June 24, 2026 Commission Meeting Agenda Packet, 20 May 2026, p. 7.

North Carolina Real Estate Commission. “Recent Arrests, Jury Verdict Highlight Ongoing Need for Wire Fraud Diligence.” NCREC Bulletins, Feb. 2019. Accessed 6 Aug. 2026.