What Hundreds of Brokers Told NCREC About the Proposed Dual Agency Rule Change

In an earlier Skyline School article, we examined a proposed North Carolina Real Estate Commission rule that could significantly change how dual agency is practiced in North Carolina.

The most consequential provision is straightforward:

“An individual broker shall not represent both the buyer and seller in the same real estate sales transaction.”

The proposed rule would not eliminate every transaction in which the same real estate firm represents both sides. Instead, when a firm represents both the buyer and seller, the proposal would generally require designated agency. Different individual brokers within the firm would be assigned to represent the competing interests of the buyer and seller.

The public comment period has now closed, and the hundreds of comments included in NCREC’s July 15, 2026, agenda packet show just how strongly brokers, brokerage leaders, associations, attorneys, instructors, and other interested parties feel about the issue.

Although many commenters opposed the proposal, others argued that ending single-broker dual agency is necessary to protect consumers. Together, the comments reveal a much deeper debate than whether dual agency is simply “good” or “bad.”

The Argument for Consumer Choice

The most common argument against the proposal was that properly informed consumers should be allowed to choose the type of representation they want.

Under North Carolina’s current framework, an individual broker may represent both the buyer and seller when dual agency is properly authorized and disclosed. The broker’s ability to advise either party becomes limited, but the parties may consent to those limitations.

One commenter summarized the consumer-choice argument this way:

“Consumers are best served when they have more choices, not fewer.”

Another wrote:

“Consumer protection and consumer autonomy are complementary principles.”

Opponents generally acknowledged that dual agency creates limitations. Their position was that those limitations can be explained to consumers through early disclosure, education, and written consent.

As one commenter stated:

“The current framework places the decision in the hands of the consumer, where it belongs.”

From this perspective, the government should ensure that consumers understand the relationship rather than prohibit them from choosing it. Several commenters suggested strengthening disclosure forms, requiring an additional acknowledgment when an offer is submitted, or expanding broker education instead of eliminating the practice.

The Argument That One Broker Cannot Fully Represent Both Sides

Supporters of the proposed restriction focused on the inherent conflict created when one broker represents parties with competing interests.

A seller typically wants the highest price and most favorable terms possible. A buyer generally wants the lowest acceptable price and terms that minimize the buyer’s risk. A broker representing both parties must protect each client’s confidential information while refraining from giving either side advice that would disadvantage the other.

One supporter of the proposal wrote:

“One broker cannot truly serve two masters.”

Another called single-broker dual agency:

“A clear conflict of interest.”

Supporters argued that the problem is structural rather than a reflection on an individual broker’s honesty or professionalism. Even a highly ethical broker may be unable to provide the same level of advocacy that each client would receive through exclusive representation.

A broker-in-charge who supported the proposal explained that, in observed dual-agency transactions, it was:

“Truly hard to remain neutral.”

From this perspective, disclosure does not resolve the underlying conflict. It merely informs consumers that the broker will be unable to provide the full advocacy normally expected from an agent. Supporters believe designated agency offers a better structure by assigning different brokers to the competing parties.

Would Consumers Really Be Losing Representation?

Several opponents identified what they viewed as a potentially counterintuitive consequence.

Under the proposal, a buyer could choose to proceed without representation while communicating directly with the listing broker. However, that same buyer could not choose to become the listing broker’s client through individual-broker dual agency.

One commenter asked the Commission to consider why an informed buyer could proceed without representation but could not select dual agency with an experienced broker after receiving disclosure and giving written consent. That distinction matters.

A listing broker may provide limited assistance to an unrepresented buyer, but the broker still represents the seller. The broker may not provide the buyer with advice or advocacy that would conflict with the seller’s interests.

Opponents worry that some consumers who currently choose dual agency could instead proceed as unrepresented buyers without fully appreciating the difference between receiving assistance from the listing broker and being represented by that broker.

Supporters would likely respond that this separation is precisely the point: the buyer should clearly understand that the listing broker represents the seller rather than mistakenly expecting balanced representation from a broker who has duties to both sides.

Small Firms and Sole Proprietors Raised Major Concerns

The effect on small brokerage firms was one of the most frequently raised practical concerns.

A large firm may be able to assign one broker to the seller and another broker to the buyer. A sole proprietor or one-broker firm cannot do that.

One commenter noted:

“A one-broker firm has no comparable option.”

If the proposal becomes effective as written, a broker operating alone could not personally represent both parties. Depending on the circumstances, the buyer might need to retain a broker from another firm, proceed without representation, or abandon the transaction.

Opponents argue that this could place small firms at a competitive disadvantage. A larger firm could retain both sides of the transaction through designated agency, while a one-person brokerage would have no equivalent option.

Commenters also questioned whether designated agency completely removes the financial conflict. Even when different brokers represent the parties, the same firm may benefit financially if the transaction closes.

Supporters of the proposed change nevertheless see an important distinction: separate designated brokers may advocate for their respective clients, while one individual dual agent must remain neutral between two competing parties.

Rural and Specialized Markets May Feel the Effects Differently

Many comments focused on rural communities and specialized property markets.

In areas with fewer brokers, consumers may have limited options for obtaining separate representation. The listing broker may also possess specialized knowledge about the property, community, land-use restrictions, septic systems, flood concerns, waterfront issues, agricultural operations, or other local conditions.

Commenters raised similar concerns regarding equestrian properties, coastal properties, investment transactions, luxury homes, land sales, and other transactions in which buyers may specifically seek out the listing broker’s expertise.

One commenter warned that the proposed change could:

“Reduce access to experienced representation.”

Another observed that consumers sometimes intentionally choose small local firms because of personal relationships, long-standing trust, or local knowledge.

The central question is whether those practical considerations justify preserving individual-broker dual agency—or whether consumers are still better protected by obtaining separate representation, even when doing so is less convenient.

Some Brokers Questioned the Evidence Behind the Proposal

Another recurring objection concerned the evidence of consumer harm.

Some commenters asked NCREC to identify data showing that properly disclosed individual-broker dual agency has caused widespread or systemic harm. They argued that many disciplinary cases involving dual agency also involve separate violations, such as:

• Failure to disclose the agency relationship properly

• Mishandling confidential information

• Misrepresentation

• Failure to disclose material facts

• Inadequate broker supervision

• Inaccurate advertising

From that perspective, the solution may be stronger enforcement of existing obligations rather than eliminating individual-broker dual agency altogether.

One commenter asked whether the proposal:

“Addresses a documented problem or merely eliminates a consumer option.”

Supporters challenged that reasoning. Some argued that dual-agency harm may be underreported because consumers do not always understand the broker’s limitations or recognize when divided loyalties affected the transaction.

One supporter explained that if dual agency is difficult for experienced professionals to understand, it may be even more confusing for members of the public who assume the broker is protecting their interests.

Could Better Disclosure Be the Compromise?

A significant theme running through the comments was the possibility of a middle ground.

Suggestions included:

• Requiring a separate dual-agency disclosure when an offer is prepared

• Making the limitations of dual agency more prominent

• Requiring consumers to acknowledge specifically what advice the broker cannot provide

• Providing enhanced dual-agency training for brokers

• Increasing penalties for undisclosed or improperly handled dual agency

• Creating accommodations for sole proprietors and small firms

• Considering a transaction-broker or facilitator model

These suggestions reflect a belief that the current system may need improvement even if a complete prohibition is not warranted.

However, supporters of the rule would likely question whether any additional form can overcome the fundamental problem: one broker cannot simultaneously advocate for a buyer’s competing interests and a seller’s competing interests.

What Happens Next?

Until final action is officially published, North Carolina brokers should continue following the agency rules currently in effect.

That includes:

• Explaining available agency relationships to consumers

• Providing the Working With Real Estate Agents Disclosure when required

• Obtaining proper authorization for dual agency

• Protecting confidential information

• Accurately documenting agency relationships

• Avoiding advice that exceeds the limitations of dual agency

• Following firm policies established by the broker-in-charge

The Bottom Line

The public comments make one thing clear: this proposal raises legitimate concerns on both sides.

Opponents see the proposed restriction as an unnecessary loss of consumer choice that could harm small firms, sole proprietors, rural communities, and consumers who knowingly prefer to work with one trusted broker.

Supporters see single-broker dual agency as an unavoidable conflict that prevents either client from receiving full advocacy, regardless of the broker’s experience, ethics, or intentions.

The disagreement ultimately comes down to two competing ideas about consumer protection:

Should informed buyers and sellers be permitted to accept the limitations of dual agency?

Or should the rules prohibit an agency relationship in which one broker cannot fully advocate for either side?

The NCREC’s final decision could produce one of the most consequential changes to North Carolina agency practice in years.

Skyline School will continue monitoring the rulemaking process and updating North Carolina brokers as additional information becomes available.

What do you think of this proposed rule change? Leave a comment below or share with a colleague in an upcoming CE Class!

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References

North Carolina Real Estate Commission. Agenda: July 15, 2026 Commission Meeting. North Carolina Real Estate Commission, 15 July 2026. PDF.